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Abstract
We study the effect of foreign takeovers on firm organization. Using a comprehensive data
set of Portuguese firms and workers spanning two decades, we find that foreign acquisitions
lead to: (1) an expansion in the scale of operations; (2) a higher number of hierarchical layers;
and (3) higher wage inequality between the top and bottom layers. These results accord
with a theory of knowledge-based hierarchies in which foreign takeovers lead to improved
productivity, higher demand, or reduced internal communication costs, and thereby induce
the acquired firms to reorganize. Evidence from auxiliary survey data reveals that acquired
firms are more likely to use information technologies that reduce internal communication
costs.
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1 Introduction
Recent theories of knowledge-based hierarchies suggest that the decision of how to organize the
acquisition, use, and communication of knowledge is central to understand issues such as the
evolution of wage inequality, the growth and productivity of firms, and the gains from inter-
national trade (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015). Drawing on a comprehensive data set of
French manufacturing firms, Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg (2015) show that reorganiza-
tion, through changes in hierarchical layers of workers, is key to understand how firms expand
and contract and the evolution of pay in each layer.
While this evidence establishes the basic empirical credibility of organization-based theories,
relatively little is known about whether and how different economic or policy shocks can lead to
firm reorganization and thereby impact labor market outcomes (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg,
2015). In this paper, we exploit comprehensive data on Portuguese firms and their workers
for the period 1991—2009 to study the effect of foreign takeovers on firm organization and pay
structure. The focus on Portugal is well-suited for this purpose: following accession to the
European Union in 1986, the country received sizable inflows of foreign investment from higher-
income nations, where firms tend to have higher productivity, better management practices and
make more extensive use of information technologies.1
Our empirical analysis proceeds in several steps. Following Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-
Hansberg (2015), we first divide the employees of each firm into four hierarchical layers using
occupational categories. Focusing on firms that were domestically-owned in the first year of
observation, we then examine if and how foreign takeovers impact their scale of operations,
internal organization and wage structure. An important challenge in identifying the effects of
foreign acquisitions is selection. If acquired firms constitute a selected subset of the universe
of firms that were initially domestic, subsequent heterogeneity in the evolution of firm perfor-
mance and organization across acquired and non-acquired firms might not be attributable to
the change in ownership (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Guadalupe, Kuzmina and Thomas, 2012;
Hijzen et al., 2013). To mitigate this threat to identification, we follow the leading approach
in this literature and examine the effects of foreign acquisitions using a difference-in-differences
matching estimator.
We find that foreign acquisitions lead to an increase in sales, labor productivity and average
wages, and to an increase in the number of hierarchical layers. The increase in the number of
layers occurs for firms that initially had one, two or three hierarchical layers prior to the foreign
acquisition. In addition, we find that acquired firms tend to experience a rise in wage inequality
between the top and bottom layers, an effect that is particularly pronounced for firms that
1Table A1 in the appendix reports that between 1996 and 2009 stocks of foreign direct investment in Portugal
grew at an annual rate of 10% per year in real terms, on average. In both 1996 and 2009, the EU and the US
accounted for over three quarters of these stocks. The main source countries of foreign investors are Spain, France,
United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany, USA, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen
(2012, pp. 194) provide evidence that firms in several of these countries tend to have better people-management
practices than firms in Portugal.
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had two or three layers before they were acquired. This rise in top-bottom inequality following
foreign takeovers appears to reflect, at least in part, changes in observable measures of skill
within each layer, notably schooling, experience and tenure.
These empirical results accord well with recent theories of knowledge-based hierarchies (Gar-
icano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012). In this framework, the
realization of output requires both labor and knowledge. More specifically, it requires successful
problem solving, which in turn requires suffi cient knowledge. Agents who do not know how to
solve a problem, also do not know who else might be able to solve it, leading to an optimal
pyramidal organization structure consisting of a bottom layer of production workers, and one
or more successive layers of managers who specialize in problem solving. Agents are rewarded
according to their knowledge, and hence workers in higher layers are rewarded with higher earn-
ings. The value of more layers is to economize on knowledge acquisition in the organization, as
fewer agents learn how to solve the more infrequent problems. However, adding more layers is
not without costs, since there are communication costs each time a problem is passed from one
layer to another. Therefore, the optimal organizational structure depends crucially on the size
of communication costs relative to the costs of acquiring knowledge.
Takeovers from investors from higher-income nations can affect optimal firm organization
through two different (but not mutually exclusive) channels. First, these acquisitions may lead
to an expansion in the scale of production because of improved productivity or higher demand.
Firms that expand production beyond a certain level optimally do so by adding layers to their
hierarchical organization. Second, these ownership changes may improve management practices
and reduce internal communication costs. This leads to an increase in the value of hierarchical
organization and therefore to a rise in the optimal number of layers, while also resulting in a larger
scale of production. When the number of hierarchical layers increases, be it through improved
productivity, higher demand or lower internal communication costs, the optimal distribution of
knowledge shifts upwards in the hierarchy, implying not only that more problems are solved,
but also that a larger share of problems are solved at the top of the organization. Such a
redistribution of knowledge can also result from a reduction of communication costs even if the
number of hierarchical layers remains unchanged. Since wages reflect knowledge, an upwards
redistribution of knowledge implies, in turn, a higher wage inequality between agents at the top
and bottom of the hierarchy.
Although the data available to us do not allow us to fully discriminate between the relative
importance of these channels, we provide suggestive evidence that reduced communication costs
played some role in driving the observed impacts of foreign ownership. As noted above, there
is evidence that firms from higher income countries tend to have superior management prac-
tices and make more extensive use of information technologies than firms in Portugal (Bloom,
Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012). To examine if foreign acquisitions lead to the adoption of these
technologies, we use an auxiliary firm-level longitudinal survey. These data are available for a
shorter period (2004-2009), and contain indicators on the utilization of the intranet, the email,
and internal networks. Using a similar identification strategy, we find that foreign acquisition
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has a positive and strongly significant effect on the use of the intranet. While the small size of
this sample recommends caution in drawing strong conclusions from these results, we interpret
this evidence as supportive of the hypothesis that foreign takeovers lead to the reduction of
internal communication costs.
In addition to the literature cited above, this paper complements and extends several strands
of existing research. In a recent related paper, Caliendo et al. (2015) find that Portuguese firms
that reorganize and add a management layer experience a rise in quantity based productiv-
ity, while also observing a drop in revenue-based productivity. A number of earlier studies
provide evidence that foreign acquisitions lead to improvements in residual-based measures of
productivity, employment, wages, innovation, and management practices, including important
contributions by Griffi th (1999), Conyon et al. (2002), Girma and Görg (2007), Almeida (2007),
Arnold and Javorcik (2009), Guadalupe, Kuzmina and Thomas (2012), Bloom, Sadun and Van
Reenen (2012) and Hijzen et al. (2013). While confirming that several of these outcomes also
improve among Portuguese firms following foreign acquisition, we believe that this paper is the
first to establish a causal link between foreign takeovers and the internal organization and pay
structure of firms. In doing so, this paper also speaks to the literature on the labor market
consequences of new information technologies, including Autor, Katz and Kruger (1998), Bres-
nahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Beaudry, Doms and Lewis
(2010) and Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2015).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the main data set used in the analysis.
Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and results related to the acquisition decision. Section
4 outlines the empirical strategy for examining the impacts of foreign acquisition on the internal
organization and pay structure of firms and reports the corresponding results. Section 5 discusses
if and how our empirical results can be rationalized in the context of the theory of knowledge-
based hierarchies. Section 6 provides additional empirical evidence on one of the specific channels
of causation identified by the theory. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper draws mainly on data from Quadros de Pessoal for the
years 1991 to 2009. This data set is an administrative census that gathers information on firms
and their workers for the corporate sector in Portugal. It is collected yearly by the Ministry of
Employment and participation is compulsory for every firm with wage earners.2 Each firm is
required to provide information about its attributes and those of each employee. The firm-level
records include information on number of employees, industry code, geographical location, and
percentage of capital that is owned by foreign investors. In the main analysis, we assume that
a firm is foreign-owned if more than 50% of capital is owned by foreign investors.3
2Data for 2001 were not collected, and hence the analysis excludes this year.
3The estimates are robust if we assume that a firm is foreign-owned when more than 10% of capital is owned
by foreign investors. Results based on this alternative threshold are available upon request.
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The set of worker attributes includes monthly wages (base wage and other components
of pay), gender, schooling, nationality, date of starting, occupation, and hours worked. The
employee records may also be linked to those of the corresponding employer in each year. The
administrative records in Quadros de Pessoal are recognized for their high reliability and are
used by the Ministry of Employment for checking a firm’s compliance with labor law. The
records must be made available to every worker in a public place of the establishment, which
reduces the likelihood of misreporting.
Following Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg (2015), we group employees into four hier-
archical layers using detailed information on occupations: CEO and directors, top managers,
supervisors, and operators. Table A2 in the Appendix provides a detailed definition of these
occupations.
We are interested in examining the effects of foreign acquisitions on firm organization and
pay structure. Hence we restrict our attention to firms that were domestically-owned in the
first year of observation, and focus on changes from domestic to foreign ownership taking place
within the same firm. In doing so, we exclude firms that experienced multiple ownership changes
over time, implying that all firms in our sample are firms that either remained domestic or were
acquired by foreign owners at some point during the period of analysis. Given our focus on
how foreign acquisitions impact the internal organization of the firm, we also exclude from the
analysis very small firms; i.e., we drop firm-year observations where the firm has less than 10
employees. We further drop firm-year observations for firms that do not have operators. With
these restrictions, we have data on 938 firms that were acquired by foreign investors during the
period of analysis.
Using the four groups of occupations reported in Table A2, we build hierarchical layers for
each firm-year observation, where layers are labelled from 0 (the bottom layer) to 3 (the top layer
in a four-layer firm). Firms that have employment in all four occupation groups will have four
hierarchical layers (0, 1, 2 and 3). Firms that only have operators will have only one layer (Layer
0). Firms that have workers in one or two of the other occupational groups (besides operators)
will have two or three hierarchical layers, respectively. The occupational composition of the
second and third layers (Layer 1 and Layer 2, respectively) may therefore vary across firms. We
also compute firm-layer-year averages of earnings, education levels and other observable worker
attributes, such as experience and tenure.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how foreign acquisitions are distributed over time and across
industries, respectively. We observe that there were a sizable number of acquisitions taking
place in most years, but with a noticeable peak in 2003. Foreign acquisitions also took place in
almost every industry, but with a quite uneven distribution.
[Figure 1 here]
[Figure 2 here]
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the full sample used in the estimation. Column
(1) reports statistics on firm-year observations with at least 10 employees for firms that were
5
initially domestically-owned. The other two columns distinguish between firms that remained
domestic during the period of analysis (Column (2)) and firms that were eventually acquired
by foreign investors (Column (3)). These statistics reveal that firms subject to acquisition tend
to be larger, more productive, pay higher average wages, and have a higher number of layers.
Notice that these differences reflect both initial heterogeneity in firm attributes among acquired
and non-acquired firms, as well as future changes.4 The statistics reported in Table A3 reveal
that, by the end of the sample period, firms in the estimation sample account for 64% of sales,
69.8% of employment and 70.4% of the wage bill of all firms that are in the Quadros de Pessoal
data set. This table further reveals that, by the end of the sample period, firms in the estimation
sample that were acquired by foreign investors accounted for 6.2% of total sales, 4.3% of total
employment and 4.6% of the total wage bill.
[Table 1 here]
3 The selection decision
Before turning to the analysis of the effects of foreign acquisition on firm organization and wage
structure, we explore the patterns of selection into acquisition. Evidence from several previous
studies suggests that foreign investors tend to “cherry pick" the largest and most productive
firms in each industry. Below we inspect for evidence on the presence of such selection in our
estimation sample.
3.1 Estimation strategy
The likelihood that a firm is acquired by foreign investors can be estimated through a logit
model. Let foreignit be an indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i is foreign-owned in year t,
and foreign∗it a latent variable whose value determines whether or not the firm will be acquired
by foreign investors in that year. We can then write foreignit=1[foreign∗it > 0] and:
foreign∗it = βXit−1 + δs + φt + µit, (1)
where Xit−1 is a vector of lagged firm attributes (log sales and log labor productivity) that would
be expected to influence the probability of acquisition in any given year (conditional on the firm
being domestically-owned one year before), and δs and φt are industry and year fixed effects,
respectively. We also estimate models with industry-specific time trends to account for the role
of idiosyncratic shocks at the industry-level. In all specifications, we cluster the standard errors
at the firm-level.




Before turning to the regression analysis, we visually inspect for the presence of selection. Figure
3 depicts the distribution of residual log sales (top panel) and residual log labor productivity
(bottom panel) for two groups of firms: (i) firms that were taken over by foreign investors
during the sample period; and (ii) firms that remained domestically-owned. The residuals remove
industry and year dummies from the original distributions of log sales and log labor productivity
across the two sets of firms.5 Inspection of this figure reveals that the distribution of each of these
variables for acquired firms lies clearly to the right of those that remain domestic, suggesting
that foreign investors tend to target larger and more productive firms within each industry.
[Figure 3 here]
Table 2 reports the estimated coeffi cients and the corresponding marginal effects (in square
brackets) from the logit model for the acquisition decision, as defined in equation (1). The
dependent variable is the dummy variable for foreign ownership which is related to either lagged
log sales or lagged log labor productivity, each relative to the industry mean. All regressions
include industry and year dummies. The regressions in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) additionally
include industry trends that account for industry-specific idiosyncratic shocks.
[Table 2 here]
The results reported in this table provide evidence that larger or more productive firms are
more likely to become foreign-owned. The estimates in columns (1) and (2) suggest an increase
in lagged log sales is associated with a significantly higher yearly probability of being acquired.
Rather than a continuous measure of sales, Columns (3) and (4) include indicator variables for
each quartile of log sales. The point estimates suggest that the probability of acquisition is
significantly higher in the third and fourth quartiles than in the first quartile. The results in
Columns (5)-(8) point to similar patterns of selection when using log labor productivity (and
the corresponding dummy indicators for quartiles), instead of log sales. In sum, the evidence
presented in this section suggest that larger and more productive firms are more likely to be
acquired by foreign investors. In other words, it suggests that foreign investors tend to “cherry
pick" the larger and better performing domestic firms within each industry.
4 Effects of foreign ownership on internal organization and pay
structure
4.1 Estimation strategy
Our strategy for examining the effect of foreign takeovers on internal organization proceeds in
two steps. First, we adopt a difference-in-differences approach to compare changes over time in
5The densities are drawn using an Epanechnikov smoothing function with a bandwidth of 0.6.
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performance and internal organization across acquired and non-acquired firms. Specifically, we
estimate an equation of the form
yit = βforeignit−1 + γi + φt + µit, (2)
where i and t index firm and year, respectively; yit is the variable of interest for firm i in year
t; foreignit−1 is the foreign ownership status of the firm in the previous year; γi is a firm fixed
effect; φt is a year effect; and µjt is the error term. We also estimate models with industry-
specific time trends to account for the role of idiosyncratic shocks at the industry-level. In all
specifications, we cluster the standard errors at the firm-level.
The firm fixed-effects account for the influence of all observable and unobservable drivers of
the acquisition decision that are constant or strongly persistent over time. If heterogeneity in
entrepreneurial capability (or productivity) across firms is fixed over time, as in the Melitz (2003)
model, this method accounts for the selection patterns documented in the previous section.
Hence we can compare the evolution of yit at acquired firms with that in firms that remain in
domestic hands.
However, if firm capability evolves over the life cycle (see, e.g., Arkolakis, 2016), this com-
parison may still be complicated by non-random selection. To address this issue, we adopt
the leading approach in the literature (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Guadalupe, Kuzmina and
Thomas, 2012) and combine difference-in-differences with propensity score matching (DD-PSM).
The propensity score is the predicted probability of a firm being acquired by foreign investors
as a function of firm attributes observed one year before the treatment occurs. We estimate a
single model for the propensity score including all years and industries. We use log sales, sales
growth, log labor productivity, number of layers, log hourly wage, and log hourly wage squared
as explanatory variables, in addition to industry and year fixed-effects. We match treated firms
by year, industry and number of layers, using one-to-one nearest-neighbor matching without
replacement and imposing common support. By using DD-PSM we essentially inspect for di-
vergence in the path of yit between acquired firms and matched control firms that had similar
observable attributes in the year prior to the acquisition.6
Table 3 reports the results from estimation of the propensity score. We use a multivari-
ate logit specification in which foreign acquisition is explained by lagged values of the above-
mentioned variables. The results confirm that foreign investors tend to target larger firms. They
also indicate that, conditional on size and labor productivity, firms with higher hourly wages
are more likely to be acquired. The negative sign of the point estimate on labor productivity
reflects the fact that, unlike in Table 2, the logit model includes simultaneously several different
(but correlated) observable attributes of firms.7
6The matching procedure implies that once a treated firm is matched with a control, the latter stays the same
throughout the whole sample period.
7When lagged values of sales and/or labor earnings are excluded from the selection equation, the coeffi cient
on lagged labor productivity turns positive. Although the variables included in the selection equation tend to
be strongly correlated, they may reflect relevant heterogeneity between acquired and non-acquired firms. To
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[Table 3 here]
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the matched sample in the year prior to acquisition.
Column (1) refers to firms that were always domestically owned during the sample period, while
Column (2) refers to firms that were acquired by foreign investors. Columns (3) and (4) report,
respectively, the t-statistic and p-value for individual t-tests of difference in means. These
statistics reveal that the matching procedure is successful at removing observable differences
between domestic and acquired firms in the year prior to acquisition. The individual t-tests
typically do not reject the mean equality of observable attributes between domestic and acquired
firms in the matched sample. The sole exception refers to lagged hourly wage growth, which
is found to be significantly lower among firms acquired by foreign investors. Notice, however,
that this variable is observed for a considerably smaller set of firms due to missing data. Since
matching is exact by industry, year and number of layers, firms in the treatment and comparison
groups have exactly the same number of layers in the year prior to the foreign acquisition.
[Table 4 here]
Table A4 in the Appendix reports results from several additional tests of matching quality.
The results provide further evidence that our matching procedure does a good job at removing
observable differences between domestic and acquired firms. The individual t-tests and the two-
group Hotelling t-square test typically do not reject the mean equality of observable attributes
between domestic and acquired firms in the matched sample. Once again, the only exception
refers to lagged hourly wage growth, which is found to be significantly larger among non-acquired
firms. The very small magnitude of the Pseudo R2 of the logit on the matched data, and the
test of joint significance of regressors given by the Chi-square test, confirm the overall quality
of the matching procedure.
[Table 5 here]
Table 5 reports summary statistics for the sample of matched firms, i.e., firms that prior
to acquisition were similar among a number of key observable attributes. In comparison with
Table 1, domestic and acquired firms in the matched sample are clearly more similar along
the set of attributes measured. This would be expected since matching seeks to remove initial
heterogeneity across firms along a number of observable attributes. Notice, however, that some
differences remain, as would also be expected if foreign acquisition were to affect how these
variables evolve over time.
4.2 Effects on the scale of operations, labor productivity and average wages
We proceed by examining the effects of foreign acquisitions on several indicators of firm per-
formance. Based on the matched sample of firms, we estimate (2) separately for four different
minimize these differences across acquired and non-acquired firms, we include them simultaneously in the logit
model used for estimation of the propensity score.
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sub-samples, divided according to the initial number of layers, where "initial" is defined as
the year prior to the acquisition.8 For each outcome of interest, we report the difference-in-
differences estimates with and without industry specific time trends. All regressions include
year dummies, and the results are presented in Table 6.
Foreign acquisitions lead to a significant expansion in the scale of operations, as measured
by log sales, for firms with initially two or three hierarchical layers. The estimated coeffi cients
for the other two subgroup of firms (with initially one or four layers) are also positive, but much
less precisely estimated. Notice, though, that firms with initially two or three layers account for
the vast majority of observations in the matched sample. Table A5 reports analogous estimates
for the effects of foreign acquisitions on employment levels, which point to broadly similar
conclusions.
[Table 6 here]
The effects of foreign acquisitions on labor productivity are similar to the effects on sales,
with positive and significant coeffi cients for firms with initially two or three layers. The positive
effects for these categories of firms are consistent with the fact that the effects on log sales
are larger than the effects on log employment (cf. Table A5), implying that labor productivity
(measured as the ratio of log sales to log employment) clearly increases following acquisition.
The final two columns in Table 6 show that hourly wages also rise as a result of a foreign
acquisition, notably for firms with at least two initial layers. A comparison of the point estimates
across the different subgroups of firms also reveal that the magnitude of the average wage
response to a foreign takeover tends to increase with the initial number of layers.
In Table A6 in the Appendix we also report equivalent estimates based on pooled regressions
(i.e., where we do not condition on the initial number of layers), using both the full and the
matched sample. Irrespective of which sample we use, and regardless of whether we include
industry-specific time trends or not, foreign acquisitions lead to a significant increase in sales,
labor productivity and average wages. In our most preferred specification (based on the matched
sample with industry-specific trends), a foreign acquisition increases these three variables by 29,
15 and 7 percent, respectively.
4.3 Effects on internal organization and pay structure
Our main interest lies in opening the "black box" of the firm and explore whether foreign
takeovers also affect the internal organization and pay structure of firms.
4.3.1 Number of layers
We start out by estimating (2) for each subgroup of firms, using the number of hierarchical
layers, as defined in Section 2, as the dependent variable. The resulting estimates, which are
8Notice that the definition of "initial" is equal for treated and untreated firms. This follows from the previously
described matching procedure, where the treated and untreated firms in each matched pair have the same number
of layers in the year prior to the foreign acquisition.
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presented in Table 7, reveal that acquired firms with initially one or two layers tend to experience
a significant and strong increase in the number of hierarchical layers of employees, compared
with firms that remain on domestic hands. For both categories of firms, the point estimate is
close to 0.2, which suggests that roughly 20 percent of the acquired firms add an extra layer
to their hierarchies, relative to comparable domestic firms, as a result of the foreign takeover.
For firms with initially three layers, the point estimate is also positive, but much smaller and
less precisely estimated, though still (weakly) statistically significant. In the final subgroup,
consisting of firms with four initial layers, there is no indication that foreign acquisitions affect
the hierarchical structure differently for acquired firms than for comparable firms that remain
domestically owned. The differential effects across different groups of firms appear to be quite
intuitive, with significantly positive effects for the type of firms with a larger scope for adding
layers to their organization (i.e., firms with initially one or two layers, and, to a lesser degree,
firms with initially three layers).
[Table 7 here]
4.3.2 Layer-level wages
We proceed by examining the effects of foreign takeovers on the pay structure of firms. The
results reported in Table 6 suggest that average wages go up following acquisition. But this
leaves open the possibility that wages evolve differently across layers within acquired firms. These
layer-level wage effects can in principle occur through two different channels: (i) a direct effect of
foreign ownership for a given organizational structure (or a given evolution of the organizational
structure); and (ii) an indirect effect through the changes in organizational structure induced
by the foreign acquisition. The estimates in Tables 8-10 seek to distinguish between these two
channels.
In Table 8 we examine how foreign acquisitions impact average hourly wages of different layers
in firms that keep the same organizational structure. For each sub-sample of firms (defined
according to the initial number of layers) we estimate a set of equations similar to (2), but
where the dependent variable is the average wage in Layer x in a z-layer firm, where z is the
initial number of layers. This implies that, for each sub-sample, we compare the wage level
in a given layer of an acquired firm with the equivalent layer of domestic firms that keep the
same organizational structure over time since the foreign acquisition. Using Mincerian wage
equations at the firm-layer level, we further decompose these wage effects into a component due
to observable worker characteristics (education, tenure and experience) and residual wages.
[Table 8 here]
The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 reveal that, for firms that keep the organizational
structure constant, there are no significant effects of foreign acquisition on wages in any layer
for firms with initially one or two layers. However, for firms with initially three layers, foreign
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acquisition leads to a significant wage increase in the top layer (Layer 2). This rise is mainly
driven by residual wages (columns (3) to (6)). On the other hand, for the last subsample,
consisting of firms with initially four layers, foreign acquisition leads to a significant wage increase
throughout the organization, and particularly in the bottom part of the hierarchy (in Layers 0
to 2). Once again, these wage effects reflect mainly changes in residual wages. Overall, these
results suggest that the effects of foreign acquisition on layer-level wages seem to depend, to a
considerable degree, on the initial number of layers in the firm.9
For the wage effects reported in Table 8, identification is based on firms that keep the
organizational structure constant over time. In Table 9, by contrast, we report estimates of how
foreign acquisition affects wages in the pre-existing layers of firms that add (one or more) layers
to their organization after being acquired. These are estimates from a set of regressions similar
to (2), but where the dependent variable is the average wage in Layer x ≤ z in a firm with
z layers before acquisition and more than z layers after acquisition.10 The reported estimates
in column (2) of Table 9 show that there are no significant effects of foreign ownership for the
group of firms that added layers to their organization after acquisition. Notice, however, that
the control group consists of non-acquired firms that underwent a similar restructuring process
(i.e., adding layers) in the period after the acquisition of their matched counterparts.
[Table 9 here]
The reported estimates in Tables 8 and 9 are layer-level wage effects of foreign acquisition
when keeping the (evolution of the) organizational structure constant, where both treated and
control firms either add layers (Table 9) or not (Table 8) in the period after acquisition. These
are therefore direct effects of foreign acquisition, as defined above. In other words, these are
effects that are caused directly by the acquisition and not indirectly by the fact that acquired
firms evolve differently (in terms of organization) from non-acquired firms after the acquisition.
As shown by Tables 8 and 9, we find significant effects of this kind only for 3- and 4-layer firms
that keep their organizational structure constant in the years after acquisition.
However, recall that the results in Table 7 reveal that foreign acquisitions lead to an increase
in the number of layers, especially among firms that initially had one or two layers. It is therefore
plausible that these organizational changes induced by foreign ownership are accompanied by
differential impacts on wages across layers. To preserve comparability across treated and control
firms, we test for the presence of such wage effects only in the top and bottom layers of the
firm. The bottom layer has always the same occupational composition and hence is comparable
across firms irrespective or their organizational structure, and the top layer is also conceptually
comparable across firms with different number of layers. Thus, we run another set of regressions
9Notice that there tends to be a somewhat larger prevalence of missing wage observations higher up in a firm’s
hierarchy, implying that the estimated wage effect in Layer x+1 tends to be based on slightly fewer observations
then the equivalent effect in Layer x. As a robustness check we have re-estimated the wage effects using only
firms for which we have wage observations in all layers. The results are practically identical and are available
upon request.
10By definition, these effects can only be estimated for firms with one, two or three initial layers.
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similar to (2), for each subsample of firms, where the dependent variable is the average hourly
wage in, respectively, the top and bottom layer of a firm.11 In the regressions where we use the
average wage in the top layer as the dependent variable, we are able to capture effects directly
related to wages paid in layers that are added to the organization as a result of the acquisition.
For example, if a foreign acquisition leads to the addition of another layer of workers who are
paid higher wages than workers in pre-existing layers, this will increase the average wage in the
firm as a result of the acquisition, all else equal.
[Table 10 here]
The results are reported in Table 10. As before, we distinguish between overall wage effects
(columns (1) and (2)), a component due to observable worker characteristics (columns (3) and
(4)), and residual wages (columns (5) and (6)). We see that foreign acquisitions lead to a
significantly positive (and quite strong) effect on top-layer wages in firms with initially two and
three layers. These positive wage effects reflect in part positive changes in the component due
to education, tenure and experience of workers, notably among firms with initially two layers.
The estimated coeffi cient in columns (1) and (2) is also positive and of similar size for firms
with initially one layer. Although the overall wage effect is not statistically significant, there is
a significant positive increase in the component due to worker characteristics (columns (3) and
(4)) among this subgroup of firms. For firms with initially four layers, the point estimate in
columns (1) and (2) is closer to zero and much less precisely estimated.
On the other hand, regarding wage effects in the bottom layer, we only find significant
effects for firms with initially four layers. For the other types of firms, the point estimates are
statistically insignificant and also very small in magnitude.
Taken together, Tables 8-10, when seen in conjunction with Tables 6-7, paint a relatively clear
and consistent picture, particularly for firms with initially two or three layers, which constitute
the vast majority of the firms in our matched sample. We know from Table 6 that these firms
(with initially two or three layers) experience an overall increase in sales, productivity and wages
as a result of foreign acquisition. And from Table 7 we know that firms with initially two layers
also experience a pronounced increase in the number of layers, whereas firms with initially three
layers are more likely to keep the same number of layers. How are these effects reflected in
layer-level wage responses?
Among the firms with initially two layers, there are no effects on layer-level wages for firms
that keep the same organizational structure after being acquired (Table 8). There are also no
effects on wages in pre-existing layers for firms that added layers after the acquisition, when
compared with similarly re-structured domestic firms (Table 9). In other words, there are no
direct wage effects of foreign acquisition when keeping the (evolution of the) organizational
structure constant. However, Table 10 shows a significant and strong effect on top-layer wages.
When seen in conjunction, this means that the wage effect of foreign acquisition in firms with
11The top layer is defined as Layer 0 for 1-layer firms, Layer 1 for 2-layer firms, Layer 2 for 3-layer firms, and
Layer 3 for 4-layer firms.
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initially two layers can almost entirely be attributed to the fact that some of these firms added
a new top layer (with higher wages than in pre-existing layers) as a result of the acquisition.
Thus, for these firms, the wage effect of foreign acquisition is predominantly caused by the fact
that acquired firms change their organizational structure (add layers) to a larger extent than
non-acquired firms.
For firms with initially three layers, there is a much smaller (and only weakly significant)
increase in the number of layers after foreign acquisition (Table 7). For this category of firms,
foreign acquisition leads to a significant wage increase in Layer 2, which is the pre-existing top
layer, for those firms that keep the same organization after acquisition (Table 8). If we estimate
the wage effect in the top layer of these firms, which is not necessarily Layer 2 in years after the
acquisition, we find a significant wage increase (Table 10) that is even larger (by approximately
one third) than the estimated effect reported in Table 8. Taken together, this shows that, for
firms with initially three layers, the increase in top-layer wages caused by foreign acquisition is
to a large extent caused by a wage increase in the existing top layer at the point of acquisition
(Layer 2), which remains, for a large share of these firms, the top layer also in the years after the
acquisition. Thus, in contrast to firms with initially two layers, the top-layer wage increase is to
a lesser extent related to changes in the organizational structure induced by the acquisition.
For firms with initially one layer, the pattern appears somewhat similar to that observed in
firms with initially two layers. These firms also experience an increase in the number of layers as
a result of foreign acquisition, which does not lead to higher wages in firms that keep the same
organizational structure. However, there are some indications that the addition of layers leads
to higher top-layer wages as a result of the acquisition, although the effect is not very precisely
estimated. Keep in mind, though, that the number of firms in this category is relatively low.
Notice also that the estimated effects of foreign acquisition on sales, labor productivity and
average wage are not statistically significant for this subgroup of firms, although all the three
point estimates have a positive sign.
For the last category of firms, with initially four layers, the picture is somewhat different.
As for firms with initially three layers, these firms tend to maintain the number of layers to the
same extent as comparable domestic firms, after being acquired by foreign investors, and tend
to experience an increase in average wages as a result of the takeover. However, in contrast to
the firms with initially three layers, significant wage increases tend to occur foremostly in the
bottom part of the hierarchy. However, when interpreting these results, we should keep in mind
that this is by far the smallest subgroup of firms, constituting less than 8 percent of the firms
in the matched sample.
The results in Table 10 suggest that foreign acquisition affects internal wage inequality
between workers at the top and at the bottom of the hierarchy, at least for the main subgroups
of firms. We test this directly by estimating a version of (2), for each subsample of firms, where
the dependent variable is the difference in average wages between the top and bottom layer of
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the firm.12 The results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 11. We see that foreign
acquisition leads to a significant increase in top-bottom wage inequality for firms with initially
two or three layers. This effect is particularly pronounced for firms with initially two layers,
with a highly significant increase in top-bottom wage inequality of almost 16%. As previously
explained, this is predominantly caused by the addition of a new top layer with higher wages than
in pre-existing layers. In columns (3) to (6) of Table 11, we further see that firms that initially
had one or two layers (which, as shown above, are more likely to add layers following the foreign
acquisition) also tend to experience an increase in top-bottom inequality in the component of
wages due to observed worker attributes.
[Table 11 here]
In order to gain even further insight on the wage effects of foreign acquisitions, we have also
estimated the effects of foreign ownership on wages averaged across all "managerial layers" (i.e.,
Layers 1-3). The results, shown in Table B1 in the Online Appendix, show subsample effects of
foreign acquisition on average managerial wages that are not statistically significant, though the
point estimates tend to be somewhat larger than for average wages in the bottom layer (cf. Table
10). These results provide further confirmation that the overall positive wage effects of foreign
acquisitions are to a large extent driven by wage increases at the top layer of the organization.
4.3.3 Normalized hours
In order to complete our characterization of the effects of foreign acquisition on internal organi-
zation, we also examine potential changes in the relative size of the different layers, as measured
by normalized hours. The normalized hours in Layer x is defined as the total number of hours
worked in this layer relative to the total number of hours worked in the top layer. Thus, by
definition, this measure only applies to layers below the top layer.
In Table 12 we report results for the effects of foreign acquisition on normalized hours based
on specifications that are completely equivalent to the ones that produce the wage effects re-
ported in Tables 8-10.13 In columns (1)-(2) we restrict attention to firms that keep the same
organizational structure after acquisition (cf. Table 8). For these firms, we estimate the effects
on normalized hours (in layers below the top layer) for firms with initially two, three or four
layers. In columns (3)-(4) we consider firms that increase the number of layers after acquisition
(cf. Table 9), with effects on normalized hours (in pre-existing layers) estimated for firms with
initially one, two or three layers.14 Finally, in columns (5)-(6), we estimate the effect of foreign
acquisition on normalized hours in the bottom layer, for each of the four subgroups of firms,
12For firms with only one layer, this difference is, by definition, zero.
13Because of missing observations on hours worked that are more prevalent in higher levels of the firm hierarchy,
our measures of normalized hours are subject to some degree of measurement error. However, this is not likely
to affect the difference in normalized hours between acquired and non-acquired firms, as long as the prevalence
of missing observations is not systematically related to ownership status.
14For firms with initially one layer, identification is based on firm-year observations in which the firm has more
than one layer.
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when we allow for indirect effects through differences in the extent of organizational restructuring
between acquired and non-acquired firms (cf. Table 10).
[Table 12 here]
The estimated results show hardly any statistically significant effects of foreign acquisition
on normalized hours by layer. Thus, whether acquired firms restructured or not, the relative
sizes of layers below the top layer do not tend to evolve differently for acquired and non-acquired
firms. The only exception is for firms with initially one layer, where foreign acquisitions lead to
a (weakly) significantly positive effect on the relative size of the bottom layer (for those acquired
firms that add layers), regardless of whether the basis of comparison is the non-acquired firms
that also add layers (columns (3)-(4)) or all non-acquired firms (columns (5)-(6)). Overall,
though, the results from Table 12 indicate that the increase in employment resulting from
foreign acquisition, as shown in Table A5, appears to be proportionally distributed throughout
the organization.
4.4 Foreign versus domestic acquisitions
Finally, we explore whether the above reported foreign ownership effects are present also when
considering the reverse type of ownership change — when previously foreign-owned firms are
acquired by domestic owners. In our data we identify 349 firms which had foreign ownership
in the first year of observation and which were subsequently acquired by domestic investors
during the period of analysis. After constructing a sample consisting of these firms along with
firms that had either domestic or foreign ownership throughout the entire period, we estimate
equation (2) using the same set of dependent variables as those reported in Tables 6-9. In
these estimations we use two alternative control groups: firms that were always domestic or
always foreign. The results are reported in Tables B2.1 to B3.2 in the Online Appendix and
show that, when identifying ownership effects only through changes of ownership from foreign to
domestic hands, foreign ownership has few systematic significant effects on sales, employment,
labor productivity, wages and number of hierarchical layers.
Two conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, the previously reported results in
this section are related to type of ownership and do not seem to be the effects of acquisitions per
se. Second, foreign ownership seems to have persistent effects. The latter conclusion is based on
the fact that ownership effects do not appear to be symmetric. In other words, foreign ownership
implies changes in the scale of operations, labor productivity, wages and internal organization
of the firm, but these effects only apply to firms that were initially owned by domestic investors.




How can our empirical results be rationalized? Clearly, there are several possible (and not mu-
tually exclusive) explanations. In this section we present a discussion of potential explanations
for some of our key results within the context of recently developed theories of knowledge hierar-
chies, which allows us to identify potential mechanisms that could create a link between foreign
acquisitions and the internal organization and wage structure of firms.
5.1 A theory of knowledge hierarchies
The theory of firms as knowledge hierarchies has been developed by Garicano (2000) and Gar-
icano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006), and further extended by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012). Here we will briefly present the main ingredients of the theory, as laid out by Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).15
The starting point is that production requires both labor and knowledge. More specifically,
the realization of output requires successful problem solving, which in turn requires suffi cient
knowledge. This is modeled as agents (workers) drawing one problem per unit of time, where
output is one if the problem is solved and zero otherwise. However, some problems occur more
often than others. If we rank problems according to their likelihood of occurring, problem z is
characterized by a density function f (z) and a corresponding cumulative distribution function
F (z), where f ′ (z) < 0. A problem can be solved by an agent who has enough knowledge.
Assuming that knowledge is cumulative, i.e., knowledge ẑ implies that all problems z ∈ [0, ẑ]
can be solved, the proportion of all problems an agent with knowledge ẑ can solve is given by
q := F (ẑ). An agent that encounters a problem that he does not know how to solve, can ask
a more knowledgeable agent for help in solving the problem. However, each time a problem is
passed from one agent to another, there is a communication cost of h < 1 units of time incurred.
A key assumption of the theory is that an agent who does not know how to solve a problem
also does not know who else might be able to solve it. Under this assumption, the optimal orga-
nizational structure is a knowledge hierarchy consisting of a bottom layer of production workers
and one or more successive layers of managers who specialize in problem solving. The amount
of knowledge increases as we move up in the hierarchical structure. Thus, production workers
learn to solve the most common problems, whereas agents in higher layers in addition learn how
to solve more exceptional problems. In each layer, unsolved problems are passed on to the next
layer until the problem is solved or until it reaches the top layer. Furthermore, the hierarchy has
a pyramidal shape, where higher layers become successively smaller. In equilibrium, agents are
rewarded according to their knowledge, which implies that wages are higher for agents working
in higher layers of the organization.16
15See also Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2015) for an overview of different variations of this modelling frame-
work.
16These general characteristics of the optimal organizational structure are similar if agents are ex ante identical,
as in Garicano (2000) or Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), or if they are ex ante heterogeneous, as in Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006). The optimal structure is also qualitatively similar even if knowledge is not cumulative,
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When designing the optimal organizational structure, the firm has to decide on the number
and size of layers, and on the required knowledge of agents in each layer. Suppose that a firm
has L layers with n0 production workers (the number of agents in Layer 0) with knowledge q0
and L − 1 layers of problem solvers (managers), where the knowledge of managers in Layer i
is qi. This implies that the number of problems passed on to Layer 1 is n0 (1− q0). Since it
takes h units of time to communicate each problem, the number of managers in Layer 1 needed
to deal with the problems passed on from Layer 0 is n1 = hn0 (1− q0). More generally, the
size of Layer i is ni = hn0 (1− qi−1). Thus, it is easy to see that q0 < q1 < ... < qL implies
n0 > n1 > ... > nL.
The value of more layers is to economize on knowledge acquisition in the organization. Since
not all problems occur with the same frequency, it is more effi cient that fewer agents learn how
to solve the more infrequent problems. By adding layers in a knowledge hierarchy, the more
knowledgeable problem solvers can be shielded from having to deal with simple (and frequently
occurring) problems and can concentrate on solving the harder (and rarer) problems, which
increases the value of acquiring knowledge. However, adding more layers is not without costs,
since there are communication costs each time a problem is passed from one layer to another.
Thus, the optimal organizational structure depends crucially on the size of communication costs
relative to the costs of acquiring knowledge.
5.2 Foreign acquisition and firm reorganization
How can foreign ownership affect optimal firm (re)organization in the context of the theory
presented above? In principle, there are two different (but not mutually exclusive) channels
through which foreign ownership could have an effect, and we will argue that the expected effects
through both channels are consistent with some of the key results of our empirical analysis.
First, foreign ownership might directly lead to an expansion in the scale of production because
of improved productivity (for example through investments in machinery and new technology)
or because of higher demand (for example through product quality upgrading or better access
to export markets through integration of acquired plants into the foreign parent company’s pro-
duction and distribution network).17 In turn, this is likely to increase the number of hierarchical
layers for at least some of the firms that increase their scale of production. As shown by Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), firms that expand beyond a certain level optimally do so by adding
layers to their hierarchical organization. This theoretical prediction is also empirically confirmed
by Caliendo et al. (2015), using data on French manufacturing firms.
Second, foreign ownership might also lead to changes in the optimal hierarchical structure
for a given scale of production. One of the common explanations in the literature regarding the
positive productivity effects of foreign acquisitions is that such a takeover also implies the transfer
of new (and better) management practices to the acquired firm (see, e.g., Bloom, Sadun and Van
as in Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
17Evidence of such foreign ownership effects is found by Arnold and Javorcik (2009), Guadalupe, Kuzmina and
Thomas (2012) and Ge, Lai and Zhu (2015), respectively for Indonesian, Spanish and Chinese firms.
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Reenen, 2012). A key element of good management practice is to secure effi cient communication
and information flows within the organization. Improvement in management practices along this
dimension will reduce the cost of communication, as measured by h in the theoretical model.
A reduction in h implies that more problems can be communicated per unit of time, which
increases the productivity of problem solvers. Thus, for a given number of hierarchical layers,
an optimal response to a reduction in communication costs is to let a larger share of problems
be solved by agents in the managerial layer(s), which implies an upwards redistribution of
knowledge in the organization. Furthermore, since the optimal number of layers is, all else
equal, determined by a trade-off between economizing on knowledge acquisition (increasing
the number of layers) and economizing on total communication costs within the organization
(reducing the number of layers), a reduction of communication costs will also increase the value
of hierarchical organization and therefore (weakly) increase the optimal number of layers. Notice
here that a reduction of communication costs also leads to higher productivity and a larger scale
of production. The reason is that a larger number of problems are communicated per unit of
time, which in turn implies that a larger share of problems are solved. This reduces the marginal
cost of production for a given hierarchical structure, and even more so if the firm is optimally
reorganized by the addition of one or more extra managerial layers.
If the number of hierarchical layers increases, be it through an incentive to increase the scale
of production or through a reduction of internal communication costs, the optimal distribution
of knowledge shifts upwards in the hierarchy, implying that a larger share of problems are solved
at the top (relative to the bottom) of the organization. As previously explained, a reduction in
communication costs will have a similar effect even if the number of layers remains unchanged.
Since wages reflect knowledge, such an upwards redistribution of knowledge will, in turn, imply
a larger wage inequality between agents at the top and bottom of the hierarchy. Thus, our two
key results, that foreign ownership leads to (i) a higher number of hierarchical layers and (ii) an
increase in wage inequality between the top and the bottom of the organization, are consistent
with both of the two above suggested links between foreign ownership and internal organization.
Furthermore, a larger scale of production will be the outcome in both cases.
While it is hard to pinpoint the exact channel(s) through which foreign ownership affects
the acquired firms’internal organization and wage structure, the positive correlations between
foreign ownership and each of the above-mentioned variables suggest that the model of knowledge
hierarchies is a relevant theoretical framework for understanding our findings. This applies in
particular to our results for the sub-sample of firms with two and three hierarchical layers at the
time of foreign acquisition, where we find that foreign ownership is associated with a larger scale
of production and a higher top-bottom wage inequality.18 The main difference between these two
categories of firms is that, for firms with initially two layers, foreign acquisition leads to a strong
and significant increase in the number of layers, whereas, for firms with initially three layers, the
effect of a foreign takeover on the number of layers is much smaller and only weakly significant.
18These firms constitute the vast majority (close to 80%) of the total number of foreign acquisitions in our
matched sample.
19
However, notice that both of these patterns are consistent with an explanation whereby foreign
acquisition leads to lower internal communication costs. In both cases, knowledge is redistributed
towards the top of the organization, resulting in a higher top-bottom wage inequality. But the
two types of firms tend do this in different ways. Whereas the firms with initially two layers tend
to add a new top layer with higher wages, the firms with initially three layers tend to keep the
same number of layers but instead increase wages in the existing top layer of the organization.
Finally, each of our suggested possible mechanisms for the effect of foreign acquisition on
internal pay structure, whether it works through firm reorganization or not, relies on a redis-
tribution of knowledge internally in the acquired firms. Indeed, our estimates do provide some
evidence that foreign acquisitions are accompanied by a within-firm redistribution of knowledge,
as indicated by an increase in top-bottom inequality in the component of wages due to average
education, experience and tenure (all of which are worker attributes that tend to be positively
associated with knowledge).
6 Effects of foreign takeovers on use of information technologies
In this section we exploit an auxiliary firm-level data set for the period 2004-2009 to examine
empirically one of the potential channels of causation identified above: foreign acquisitions lead
to the adoption of information technologies that are expected to improve the information flow
within the organization, and thereby reduce internal communication costs.
To this end, we merged Quadros de Pessoal with data from Inquérito à Utilização de Tec-
nologias de Informação e da Comunicação nas Empresas, a firm-level survey conducted since
2004 by the National Statistical Institute which gathers information on the use of information
technologies. Interestingly for our purposes, this survey collects information on whether the firm
makes use of several information technologies that are expected to stimulate effi cient communi-
cation flows in the organization, notably the intranet, the e-mail, and internal networks. The
survey also contains information on whether firms use the extranet, which would be expected
to predominately improve information flows between the firm and outside parties. Using unique
firm identifiers provided by the National Statistical Institute, we were able to match information
for 1624 firms from our main sample, of which 172 were acquired by foreign investors during the
period of analysis.
Table A7 provides summary statistics on these linked auxiliary survey data. These statistics
reveal that the majority of firms in this sample used the intranet, the e-mail, or internal networks:
in the full sample, the proportion of firm-year observations for which these indicators take the
value of one ranges between 69.9% and 99.4%. The proportion of firms using the extranet in the
full sample is lower at 44%. These statistics also reveal that firms acquired by foreign investors
are more likely to use all these information technologies. These proportions are higher in the
matched sample than in the full sample. The share of firms using the e-mail is very close to
unity in the full sample and equals one in the matched sample. Therefore, the data do not




In order to examine whether foreign acquisitions impact the use of each of these technologies,
we adopt the identification strategy outlined in Section 4. The difference-in-differences estimates
in Panel A of Table 13 reveal that foreign acquisitions lead to a statistically significant and strong
increase in the propensity to use the intranet. This finding holds both in the full sample (columns
(1) and (2)) and in the matched sample (columns (3) and (4)).
A potential concern about this result is that treated and control firms might exhibit pre-
acquisition differences in the use of the intranet. For robustness, in Table A8 we examine
the effects of foreign acquisitions on the use of this technology in a sample of firms that was
matched also on intranet use prior to the foreign acquisition. Reassuringly, the estimates of
interest remain positive, significant and fairly large in magnitude.
It is important to emphasize that the analysis in this section is based on a smaller and less
representative sample of firms.19 This feature of the data recommends particular caution in
drawing strong conclusions from these results. With this caveat in mind, it is interesting that
these estimates are in line with the predictions of the theory of knowledge-based hierarchies.
In particular, since the intranet is essentially aimed at promoting more effi cient communication
flows inside organizations, the fact that its use tends to increases following foreign acquisition
can be interpreted as supporting evidence for one of the precise mechanisms emphasized by this
class of models, as explained and discussed in Section 5.
7 Concluding remarks
Recent theories of knowledge-based hierarchies suggest that reorganization, through changes in
hierarchical layers of employees, is key to understand how firms expand and contract and the
evolution of pay in each layer. While existing evidence lends strong support to this class of
models, relatively little is known about whether and how different economic or policy shocks
can lead to firm reorganization and thereby influence labor market outcomes.
We exploited comprehensive data on Portuguese firms and their workers spanning the period
1991 to 2009 to study the effect of foreign takeovers on the internal organization and pay struc-
ture of firms. Our results provide evidence that foreign acquisitions lead to: (1) an expansion
in the scale of operations; (2) a higher number of hierarchical layers; and (3) increased wage
inequality between the top and bottom layers in firms that reorganize and add layers. These
results accord well with a theory of knowledge-based hierarchies in which foreign takeovers lead
19Besides covering a much shorter time period, this data set includes all Portuguese firms only above a certain
size (more than 250 employees). For smaller firms, the data include only a stratified random sample that is drawn
each year. This implies a clear bias towards larger firms in the process of linking this data with data from our
main sample, as evidenced by a considerably higher average firm size (as well as labor productivity and average
wage) in the sample based on the auxiliary data (Table A7) than in the sample used in the main analysis (Table
1).
21
to improved productivity, higher demand, or reduced communication costs within the acquired
firms. Using an auxiliary survey data set, we provided evidence that foreign acquisition has a
positive and significant effect on the use of the intranet. Although the small size of this sample
recommends caution in drawing strong conclusions from this result, we interpret it as suggestive
that reduced communication costs played some role in driving the impacts of foreign acquisitions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Foreign direct investment in Portugal
Table A1 reports evidence on the stocks and rates of growth of foreign direct investment in
Portugal during the period 1996-2009.
[Table A1 here]
A.2 Definition of hierarchical layers
Following Caliendo, Monte and Rossi-Hansberg (2015), we use detailed information on workers
occupation to construct four hierarchical layers of employees. Table A2 presents the definition
of these occupations.
[Table A2 here]
A.3 Definitions of variables from Quadros de Pessoal
Here we describe in more detail the variables used in the main analysis:
Foreign ownership: Dummy variable that equals one if more than 50% of capital is owned by
foreign investors;
Sales: Total value of sales (in Portugal and abroad) of the firm during the reference year;
Employment : Number of employees at the firm in October of the reference year;
Labor productivity : Ratio between the the total value of sales and employment during the
reference year;
Number of layers: Number of hierarchical layers at the firm in October of the reference year;
Hourly wage: Ratio between the wage bill and the total number of hours worked at the firm
in October of the reference year. The wage bill is computed on the basis of the monthly
wage and employment. The monthly wage includes the base wage and other components
of pay;
Hours: Total number of hours worked at the firm-layer in the reference year.
Education: Average number of years of schooling of employees at the firm-layer in the reference
year;
Tenure: Average number of years of tenure of employees at the firm-layer in the reference year;
Potential experience: Average number of years of potential labor market experience of employ-
ees at the firm-layer in the reference year. Potential experience is defined as the difference
between the worker’s age and the number of years of schooling;
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All monetary variables are in euros and have been deflated to constant 2009 prices using GDP
and CPI deflators (obtained from AMECO) for sales and wages, respectively.
A.4 Definitions of variables from Inquérito à Utilização de Tecnologias de
Informação e da Comunicação nas Empresas
Here we describe in more detail the variables employed in the analysis using auxiliary survey
data:
Use of intranet: Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has intranet in the reference year;
Use of e-mail: Dummy variable that equals one if the firms uses the e-mail in the reference
year;
Use of extranet: Dummy variable that equals one if the firms uses the extranet in the reference
year;
Use of internal networks: Dummy variable that equals one if the firms uses internal networks
in the reference year.
A.5 Additional summary statistics
Table A3 provides summary statistics on the estimation sample relative to the private sector as
a whole.
[Table A3 here]
A.6 Propensity score matching
Table A4 shows the tests of matching quality discussed in Section 4.1.
[Table A4 here]
A.7 Additional results
Table A5 reports the effects of foreign ownership on employment.
[Table A5 here]
Table A6 reports the effects of foreign ownership on sales, labor productivity, hourly wage and
number of layers using the pooled sample.
[Table A6 here]
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A.8 Summary statistics and robustness, auxiliary survey data
Table A7 provides summary statistics on auxiliary survey data from Inquérito à Utilização de
Tecnologias de Informação e da Comunicação nas Empresas. Table A8 reports effects of foreign





All firms Always domestic Acquired by foreign 
investors
(1) (2) (3)
Log sales 14.0677 14.0411 15.5926
(1.3365) (1.3169) (1.5529)
Employment 42.1986 40.4140 144.7823
(143.0868) (128.6462) (485.1442)
Log labor productivity 10.8681 10.8561 11.5595
(1.0532) (1.0453) (1.2592)
Number of layers 2.0508 2.0411 2.6098
(0.7620) (0.7572) (0.8227)
Log hourly wage 1.4504 1.4419 1.9366
(0.4146) (0.4073) (0.5263)
Education (years of schooling) 6.2147 6.1780 8.3235
(2.1079) (2.0792) (2.6149)
Tenure (years) 7.4826 7.4883 7.1516
(5.2359) (5.2356) (5.2389)
Potential experience (years) 25.8508 25.9121 22.3306
(6.5251) (6.5114) (6.3436)
N (obs.) 432,955 425,552 7,403
N (firms) 74,666 73,728 938
Table 1: Summary statistics, full sample, 1991-2009
Notes: The table reports means and standarddeviations (in parentheses) for the full sample of firm-
year observations with at least 10 employees over the period 1991-2009 (except 2001 and 2002) of
firms that are not foreign owned in their first year in the sample. A firm is foreign owned if foreign
investors holdat least 50% of capital. Column (1) refers to all firms, column (2) refers to firms that
did not change ownership during the sample period, and column (3) refers to firms that changed
foreign ownership status only once during the sample period. Monetary variables are in 2009 prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log sales 0.7195*** 0.7199***
(0.0226) (0.0226)
[0.0036***] [0.0035***]
2nd quartile 0.6341*** 0.6343***
(0.1319) (0.1317)
[0.0031***] [0.0030***]
3rd quartile 1.4868*** 1.4849***
(0.1259) (0.1256)
[0.0074***] [0.0070***]
4th quartile 2.8248*** 2.8298***
(0.1147) (0.1148)
[0.0140***] [0.0133***]
Log labor productivity 0.6759*** 0.6758***
(0.0377) (0.0379)
[0.0046***] [0.0044***]
2nd quartile 0.1241 0.1114
(0.1033) (0.1035)
[0.0008] [0.0007]
3rd quartile 0.7007*** 0.6894***
(0.1063) (0.1066)
[0.0046***] [0.0043***]
4th quartile    1.6708***   1.6663***
(0.1010) (0.1015)
[0.0111***] [0.0105***]
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 432,955 432,955 432,955 432,955 432,955 432,955
N (firms) 74,666 74,666 74,666 74,666 74,666 74,666 74,666 74,666
Table 2: The acquisition decision
Dependent variable: foreign ownership
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and ***1% level. Log sales and log labor
productivityare relative to the industrymean and lagged one year relative to the dependent variable. All regressions include
year and industry dummies.  Marginal effects at the mean of the variables in square brackets.
Coefficient
Marginal effect 
(at mean of 
variable)
(1) (2)
Log sales 0.4477*** 0.00026***
(0.0453) (0.00003)
Sales growth 0.0017* 0.00000*
(0.0009) (0.00000)
Log labor productivity -0.4274*** -0.00025***
(0.0675) (0.00004)
Labor productivity growth -0.0020 -0.00000
(0.0014) (0.00000)
Log hourly wage 4.2675*** 0.00250***
(0.3992) (0.00021)
Log hourly wage squared -0.5318*** -0.00031***
(0.0873) (0.00005)
Hourly wage growth 0.1302*** 0.00008***
(0.0132) (0.00004)






Table 3: Propensity score estimates
Notes: All independent variables defined in levels are lagged one
year (prior to acquisition). Growth of sales, labor productivity
and hourly wages is calculated between the year prior to
acquisition and the acquisition year. Standard errors in






Dependent variable: foreign ownership





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log sales 15.078 15.060 -0.20 0.845
Sales growth 4.917 4.216 -0.20 0.842
Lagged sales growth* 3.888 13.778 1.45 0.148
Log labor productivity 11.263 11.307 0.59 0.558
Labor productivity growth 3.945 3.720 -0.08 0.938
Lagged labor productivity growth* 3.483 14.682 1.56 0.118
Log hourly wage 1.847 1.869 0.76 0.447
Hourly wage growth 0.052 0.081 0.88 0.381
Lagged hourly wage growth* 0.187 0.084 -2.30 0.022
Employment 112.6 92.4 -1.01 0.311
Number of layers 2.432 2.432 0.00 1.000
N (obs.) 616 616
N (firms) 598 616
Notes: The table reports means for the matched sample of firm-year observations with at least 10 employees 
in the year prior to acquisition. A firm is foreign owned if foreign investors holdat least 50% of capital.
Column (1) refers to firms that didnot change ownershipduringthe sample period, and column (2) refers
to firms that changed foreign ownership status only once duringthe sample period. Growth of sales, labor
productivity and hourly wages is calculated between the year prior to acquisition and the year of
acquisition. Lagged growth of these variables is calculated between two years prior to acquisition and one
year prior to the acquisition. For variables marked with an asterisk, the sample refers to 400 (329)
domestic (acquired) firms due to missing data.
Table 4: Summary statistics, matched sample, year prior to acquisition 






Log sales 15.4336 15.2731 15.6303
(1.6001) (1.6236) (1.5485)
Employment 141.7982 138.2111 146.1925
(525.3862) (576.9171) (454.3826)
Log labor productivity 11.4536 11.3555 11.5737
(1.1940) (1.1294) (1.2583)
Number of layers 2.5552 2.5149 2.6047
(0.8188) (0.8147) (0.8212)
Log hourly wage 1.8390 1.7769 1.9150
(0.4913) (0.4603) (0.5167)
Education (years of schooling) 7.6174 7.1569 8.1817
(2.4798) (2.3794) (2.4839)
Tenure (years) 8.5725 9.6840 7.2108
(5.5509) (5.5832) (5.1971)
Potential experience (years) 24.4632 26.0816 22.4806
(6.4633) (6.2607) (6.1481)
N (obs.) 11,082 5,985 5,097
N (firms) 1214 598 616
Table 5: Summary statistics, matched sample, 1991-2009
Notes: The table reports means and standarddeviations (in parentheses) for the matched sample
of firm-year observations with more than10 employees over the period 1991-2009 (except 2001 and
2002) of firms that are not foreign owned in their first year in the sample. A firm is foreign owned
if foreign investors holdat least 50% of capital. Column (1) refers to all firms, column (2) refers to
firms that did not change ownership during the sample period, and column (3) refers to firms
that changed foreign ownership status only once during the sample period. Monetary variables
are in 2009 prices.
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firms with initially 1 layer
Foreign ownership 0.1443 0.1372 0.0653 0.0359 0.0423 0.0281
  (0.1253)     (0.1230)   (0.1186)     (0.1142)   (0.0308)     (0.0315)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446
N (firms) 181 181 181 181 181 181
Firms with initially 2 layers
Foreign ownership 0.3226***    0.3288*** 0.1607** 0.1660** 0.0488** 0.0476**
  (0.0914)     (0.0895) (0.0703) (0.0705)   (0.0226)     (0.0226)     
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 3,763 3,763 3,763 3,763 3,763 3,763
N (firms) 432 432 432 432 432 432
Firms with  initially 3 layers 
Foreign ownership 0.2955***    0.3003*** 0.1611** 0.1677** 0.0737*** 0.0726***
  (0.0858)     (0.0872)   (0.0769)     (0.0787)   (0.0201)     (0.0202)     
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 4,938 4,938 4,938 4,938 4,938 4,938
N (firms) 510 510 510 510 510 510
Firms with initially 4 layers 
Foreign ownership 0.2511 0.272 0.1568 0.1817 0.1398*** 0.1331***
  (0.1738)     (0.1761)   (0.1426)     (0.1461)   (0.0507)     (0.0484)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 976 976 976 976 976 976
N (firms) 94 94 94 94 94 94
log hourly wagelog sales log labor productivity
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and ***1% level.
Table 6: Effects of foreign acquisition on sales, labor productivity and hourly wage
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2)
Firms with initially 1 layer
Foreign ownership 0.2123*** 0.1975**
  (0.0819)     (0.0811)
Industry trends N Y
N (obs.) 1,446 1,446
N (firms) 181 181
Firms with initially 2 layers
Foreign ownership 0.2119*** 0.2063***
  (0.0590)     (0.0578)
Industry trends N Y
N (obs.) 3,763 3,763
N (firms) 432 432
Firms with  initially 3 layers
Foreign ownership 0.0698* 0.0676*
  (0.0403)     (0.0399)
Industry trends N Y
N (obs.) 4,938 4,938
N (firms) 510 510
Firms with  initially 4 layers
Foreign ownership 0.0244 -0.0245
  (0.1238)     (0.1240)
Industry trends N Y
N (obs.) 976 976
N (firms) 94 94
Table 7: Effects of foreign acquisition on the number of layers
number of layers
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level,
**5% level, and ***1% level.
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firms with 1 layer
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 0
Foreign ownership -0.0079 -0.0179 0.017 0.0059 -0.0248 -0.0238
  (0.0449)     (0.0492)   (0.0266)     (0.0279)   (0.0489)     (0.0540)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 767 767 767 767 767 767
N (firms) 163 163 163 163 163 163
Firms with 2 layers
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 0
Foreign ownership 0.0016 0.0018 -0.0039 -0.0021 0.0055 0.0039
  (0.0353)     (0.0352)     (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0321) (0.0317)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 2,088 2,088 2,088 2,088 2,088 2,088
N (firms) 413 413 413 413 413 413
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 1
Foreign ownership 0.0291 0.0273 0.0299 0.0294 -0.0009 -0.0021
  (0.0447)     (0.0452) (0.0202) (0.0201)   (0.0442)     (0.0437)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772
N (firms) 380 380 380 380 380 380
Firms with 3 layers
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 0
Foreign ownership 0.0273 0.0287 -0.0124 -0.0115 0.0397* 0.0402*
  (0.0231)     (0.0238)   (0.0087)     (0.0084)   (0.0222)     (0.0229)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309 3,309
N (firms) 493 493 493 493 493 493
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 1
Foreign ownership 0.0233 0.0214 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0234 0.0218
  (0.0306)     (0.0314)       (0.0144)     (0.0142)       (0.0284)     (0.0294)     
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 3,292 3,292 3,292 3,292 3,292 3,292
N (firms) 493 493 493 493 493 493
Table 8: Effects of foreign acquisition on log hourly layer-level wages for firms that did not 
change the organization
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies. Standard
errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and ***1% level.
ResidualObservedlog hourly wage
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 2
Foreign ownership 0.0928** 0.1035** 0.0132 0.0179 0.0796* 0.0856*
  (0.0428)     (0.0422)   (0.0188)     (0.0189)   (0.0417)     (0.0412)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 2,839 2,839 2,839 2,839 2,839 2,839
N (firms) 462 462 462 462 462 462
Firms with 4 layers
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 0
Foreign ownership 0.1388* 0.1660** -0.0064 -0.0006 0.1452* 0.1666*
  (0.0735)     (0.0805)   (0.0219)     (0.0190)   (0.0781)     (0.0850)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 402 402 402 402 402 402
N (firms) 87 87 87 87 87 87
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 1
Foreign ownership 0.2159*** 0.2099*** 0.0185 0.0096 0.1974*** 0.2003***
  (0.0728)     (0.0633)   (0.0362)     (0.0359)   (0.0671)     (0.0634)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 402 402 402 402 402 402
N (firms) 87 87 87 87 87 87
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 2
Foreign ownership 0.1406 0.1664* 0.0229* 0.0230* 0.1177 0.1434
  (0.0998)     (0.1000)   (0.0119)     (0.0131)   (0.0998)     (0.0998)     
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 392 392 392 392 392 392
N (firms) 85 85 85 85 85 85
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 3
Foreign ownership 0.1454 0.1912 0.0038 -0.0081 0.1417 0.1993
  (0.2612)     (0.2759) (0.0802) (0.0918) (0.2375) (0.2497)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 363 363 363 363 363 363
N (firms) 81 81 81 81 81 81
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies. Standard
errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and ***1% level.
Observed Residuallog hourly wage
Table 8:  Effects of foreign acquisition on log hourly layer-level wages for firms that did not 
change the organization (cont.)
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firms with initially 1 layer
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 0
Foreign ownership 0.0840** 0.0601 -0.0123 -0.0089 0.0962** 0.0691
  (0.0415)     (0.0409)   (0.0218)     (0.0216)   (0.0445)     (0.0444)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 824 824 824 824 824 824
N (firms) 160 160 160 160 160 160
Firms with initially 2 layers
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 0
Foreign ownership 0.0098 0.0021 -0.0174 -0.0177 0.0272 0.0198
  (0.0361)     (0.0360)   (0.0218)     (0.0216)   (0.0455)     (0.0465)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846 1,846
N (firms) 372 372 372 372 372 372
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 1
Foreign ownership -0.0903 -0.1011 -0.0109 -0.0121 -0.0794 -0.0890
  (0.0649)     (0.0670)   (0.0180)     (0.0178)   (0.0661)     (0.0687)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678
N (firms) 345 345 345 345 345 345
Firms with initially 3 layers
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 0
Foreign ownership 0.0425* 0.0368 -0.0073 -0.0067 0.0498** 0.0436**
  (0.0235)     (0.0239)   (0.0079)     (0.0078)   (0.0215)     (0.0220)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 2,768 2,768 2,768 2,768 2,768 2,768
N (firms) 490 490 490 490 490 490
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 1
Foreign ownership -0.0032 -0.0055 -0.0075 -0.0071 0.0043 0.0016
  (0.0306)     (0.0319)       (0.0069)     (0.0068)       (0.0305)      (0.0316)     
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701 2,701
N (firms) 489 489 489 489 489 489
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 2
Foreign ownership 0.0678 0.0639 -0.0110 -0.0082 0.0788* 0.0721
  (0.0465)     (0.0465) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0478) (0.0477)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121
N (firms) 433 433 433 433 433 433
Table 9: Effects of foreign acquisition on log hourly wages for firms that increase the number of 
layers
Observed Residuallog hourly wage
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies. Standard errors in
parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and ***1% level.
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firms with initially 1 layer
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of top layer
Foreign ownership 0.1258 0.1070 0.1452** 0.1628** -0.0193 -0.0257
(0.0788) (0.0810) (0.0602) (0.0582) (0.0679) (0.0734)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232
N (firms) 180 180 180 180 180 180
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 0
Foreign ownership 0.0246 0.0150 0.0118 0.0077 0.0128 0.0073
  (0.0309)     (0.0317)   (0.0199)     (0.0204)   (0.0349)     (0.0361)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446 1,446
N (firms) 181 181 181 181 181 181
Firms with initially 2 layers
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of top layer
Foreign ownership 0.1540*** 0.1552*** 0.0684* 0.0740** 0.0857** 0.0712**
(0.0512) (0.0517) (0.0377) (0.0373) (0.0415) (0.0409)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 3,089 3,089 3,089 3,089 3,089 3,089
N (firms) 418 418 418 418 418 418
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 0
Foreign ownership -0.0006 -0.0018 -0.0101 -0.0076 0.0095 0.0058
  (0.0227)     (0.0227)       (0.0123)     (0.0122)   (0.0236)     (0.0235)     
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 3,763 3,763 3,763 3,763 3,763 3,763
N (firms) 432 432 432 432 432 432
Residuallog hourly wage Observed
Table 10: Effects of foreign acquisition on log hourly wage of top and bottom layers
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firms with initially 3 layers
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of top layer
Foreign ownership 0.1075** 0.1117** 0.0311 0.0331 0.0765* 0.0786*
(0.0453) (0.0451) (0.0266) (0.0268) (0.0408) (0.0408)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 4,285 4,285 4,285 4,285 4,285 4,285
N (firms) 498 498 498 498 498 498
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 0
Foreign ownership 0.0246 0.0214 -0.0077 -0.0081 0.0323* 0.0294
  (0.0193)     (0.0197)   (0.0078)     (0.0077)   (0.0190)     (0.0193)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 4,938 4,938 4,938 4,938 4,938 4,938
N (firms) 510 510 510 510 510 510
Firms with initially 4 layers
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of top layer
Foreign ownership 0.0119 -0.0118 -0.1058 -0.1184 0.1178 0.1066
(0.1379) (0.1389) (0.0843) (0.0846) (0.1214) (0.119)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 874 874 874 874 874 874
N (firms) 94 94 94 94 94 94
Dependent variable: log hourly wage of layer 0
Foreign ownership 0.1556*** 0.1617*** 0.0071 0.0105 0.1485*** 0.1511***
  (0.0498)     (0.0502)   (0.0193)     (0.0182)   (0.0487)     (0.0495)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 976 976 976 976 976 976
N (firms) 94 94 94 94 94 94
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and ***1% level.
Table 10: Effects of foreign acquisition on log hourly wage of top and bottom layers 
(cont.)
log hourly wage Observed Residual
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firms with initially 1 layer
Foreign ownership 0.1115 0.1040 0.1097** 0.1056** 0.0018 -0.0016
(0.0751) (0.0772) (0.0529) (0.0517) (0.0527) (0.0568)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232
N (firms) 180 180 180 180 180 180
Firms with initially 2 layers
Foreign ownership 0.1568*** 0.1581*** 0.0637* 0.0656* 0.0931** 0.0926**
(0.0546) (0.0553) (0.0346) (0.0346) (0.0426) (0.0428)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 3,089 3,089 3,089 3,089 3,089 3,089
N (firms) 418 418 418 418 418 418
Firms with initially 3 layers
Foreign ownership 0.0805* 0.0864* 0.0366 0.0383* 0.0439 0.0480
(0.0487) (0.0487) (0.0228) (0.0233) (0.0436) (0.0438)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 4,285 4,285 4,285 4,285 4,285 4,285
N (firms) 498 498 498 498 498 498
Firms with initially 4 layers
Foreign ownership -0.1372 -0.1709 -0.0637 -0.0783 -0.0735 -0.0926
(0.1438) (0.1439) (0.0692) (0.0691) (0.1273) (0.1253)
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 874 874 874 874 874 874
N (firms) 94 94 94 94 94 94
Residual 
Wage difference 
between top and 
bottom layers
Observed
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies. Standard 
errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and ***1% level.
Table 11: Effects of foreign acquisition on top-bottom internal wage inequality
Table 12: Effects of foreign acquisition on normalized hours
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firms with initially 1 layer
Dependent variable: normalized hours of layer 0
Foreign ownership 13.9309** 14.2290* 9.7701** 10.3958*
  (6.9775)     (7.7709)       (4.9335)     (5.5063)     
Industry trends N Y N Y
N (obs.) 665 665 1,232 1,232
N (firms) 159 159 180 180
Firms with initially 2 layers
Dependent variable: normalized hours of layer 0
Foreign ownership 1.5527 1.2954 11.9954 11.0701 0.3557 0.7795
  (2.0931)     (1.9229)      (12.2355)     (12.1946)      (4.6795)     (4.5601)     
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 1,772 1,772 1,440 1,440 3,089 3,089
N (firms) 380 380 332 332 418 418
Firms with initially 3 layers
Dependent variable: normalized hours of layer 0
Foreign ownership 17.434 16.263 -2.7641 -4.8517 4.5824 2.8143
  (12.7673)     (12.9900)   (15.8110)     (16.2259)     (12.6778)     (13.0055)     
Industry trends N Y N Y N Y
N (obs.) 2,839 2,839 2,450 2,450 4,285 4,285
N (firms) 462 462 467 467 498 498
Dependent variable: normalized hours of layer 1
Foreign ownership 2.2711 2.2359 0.1784 0.0652
  (1.6022)     (1.6454)       (3.2434)     (3.2720)     
Industry trends N Y N Y
N (obs.) 2,839 2,839 2,072 2,072
N (firms) 462 462 432 432
All firms
Firms that keep the 
number of layers
Firms that increase the 
number of layers
Table 12: Effects of foreign acquisition on normalized hours (cont.)
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firms with initially 4 layers
Dependent variable: normalized hours of layer 0
Foreign ownership 2.4573 7.5276 -10.3235 -9.7779
(11.9307) (9.7302)   (14.4428)     (14.8628)     
Industry trends N Y N Y
N (obs.) 363 363 874 874
N (firms) 81 81 94 94
Dependent variable: normalized hours of layer 1
Foreign ownership
4.1718 5.1704
  (4.0971)     (3.5562)     
Industry trends N Y
N (obs.) 363 363
N (firms) 81 81
Dependent variable: normalized hours of layer 2
Foreign ownership 0.2297 0.3651
  (0.9298)     (0.9510)     
Industry trends N Y
N (obs.) 363 363
N (firms) 81 81
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies. Standard
errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and ***1% level.
Firms that keep the 
number of layers
Firms that increase the 
number of layers
Bottom layer of all 
firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent variable: use of intranet
Foreign ownership 0.1989*** 0.2041*** 0.2238** 0.2838***
(0.0617) (0.0622) (0.0973) (0.104)
Industry trends N Y N Y
N (obs.) 4,268 4,268 200 200
N (firms) 1,624 1,624 61 61
B. Dependent variable: use of email
Foreign ownership -0.0017 -0.0012 n.d. n.d.
(0.0012) (0.0011) n.d. n.d.
Industry trends N Y
Matched sample N N
N (obs.) 4,268 4,268
N (firms) 1,624 1,624
C. Dependent variable: use of extranet
Foreign ownership 0.0218 0.0156 0.1017 0.0781
(0.1054) (0.1053) (0.1367) (0.1518)
Industry trends N Y N Y
N (obs.) 4,268 4,268 200 200
N (firms) 1,624 1,624 61 61
D. Dependent variable: use of internal networks
Foreign ownership -0.0292*** -0.0291*** -0.0162 -0.0106
(0.0097) (0.0100) (0.0203) (0.0139)
Industry trends N Y N Y
N (obs.) 4,268 4,268 200 200
N (firms) 1,624 1,624 61 61
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level, and *1%
level.
Table 13: Effects of foreign acquisition on the use of information technologies
Full sample Matched sample
stock % of total stock % of total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spain 7,848 28.57 22,597 24.04 8.5
France 3,532 12.86 6,118 6.51 4.3
United Kingdom 2,835 10.32 6,973 7.42 7.2
Netherlands 2,664 9.70 16,747 17.81 15.2
Germany 2,423 8.82 3,035 3.23 1.7
USA 1,597 5.81 1,442 1.53 -0.8
Switzerland 1,237 4.50 850 0.90 -2.9
Luxembourg 1,148 4.18 7,393 7.86 15.4
Italy 587 2.14 4,280 4.55 16.5
Belgium 469 1.71 1,075 1.14 6.6
Brazil 436 1.59 3,703 3.94 17.9
Ireland 134 0.49 1,422 1.51 19.9
Angola 7 0.03 255 0.27 31.8
European Union 22,815 83.04 72,043 76.64 9.2
Total 27,473 100.00 94,005 100.00 9.9





Notes: The table reports end-of-year stocks of foreign direct investment in Portugalby
country of origin in 1996 and 2009. Stocks are in millions of euros at 2009 prices.
Column (5) reports the annual average rate of growth of FDI stocks between 1996 and
2009. Data come from the Balance of Payments Statistics of the Central Bank of
Portugal. Data are reported in accordance with BPM6 methodology and were updated
in February 2016. Data prior to 1996 are not available.
Occupation level Occupations Correspondence in CNP94
CEO and Directors
”General directors” and ”directors and managers of small 
firms” 
121; 131
Top managers ”Directors of production, finance or other” 122, 123
Supervisors
”Specialists in scientific and intellectual jobs”; 
”Intermediate-level technicians and professionals”
between 200 and 400
Operators
”Administrative staff”; ”Service and sales staff”; ”Workers 
and craft”; ”Machine operators”;”Unskilled workers”
above 400
Table A2: Definition of hierarchical occupations
Notes: The table reports the definition of occupations included in each layer using the 1994 National










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1992 0.5548 0.5673 0.5883 0.5276 0.5361 0.5546 0.0270 0.0270 0.0283
1993 0.5806 0.5907 0.6090 0.5278 0.5551 0.5712 0.0339 0.0281 0.0292
1994 0.5815 0.6049 0.6240 0.5311 0.5632 0.5792 0.0492 0.0312 0.0336
1995 0.5839 0.6104 0.6283 0.5323 0.5744 0.5892 0.0496 0.0324 0.0348
1996 0.5927 0.6174 0.6340 0.5355 0.5760 0.5910 0.0509 0.0329 0.0348
1997 0.5970 0.6182 0.6351 0.5392 0.5773 0.5916 0.0535 0.0332 0.0356
1998 0.5988 0.6202 0.6369 0.5393 0.5779 0.5917 0.0540 0.0344 0.0368
1999 0.5988 0.6205 0.6408 0.5394 0.5796 0.5968 0.0542 0.0349 0.0375
2000 0.6012 0.6266 0.6437 0.5471 0.5849 0.6000 0.0548 0.0353 0.0378
2003 0.6026 0.6275 0.6456 0.5478 0.5950 0.6108 0.0550 0.0356 0.0381
2004 0.6144 0.6342 0.6525 0.5594 0.6009 0.6177 0.0563 0.0409 0.0430
2005 0.6156 0.6409 0.6538 0.5632 0.6060 0.6182 0.0565 0.0410 0.0437
2006 0.6197 0.6438 0.6620 0.5647 0.6108 0.6244 0.0578 0.0416 0.0440
2007 0.6254 0.6489 0.6727 0.5712 0.6135 0.6347 0.0594 0.0417 0.0449
2008 0.6336 0.6938 0.6995 0.5758 0.6656 0.6702 0.0595 0.0423 0.0452
2009 0.6402 0.6982 0.7041 0.6063 0.6712 0.6758 0.0615 0.0429 0.0458
N (obs.)
N (firms)
Notes: The table reports the share of sales, employment and wage bill of firms used in the estimation sample
relative to the whole private sector. It includes firm-year observations with more than 10 employees of firms
that are not foreign owned in their first year in the sample. A firm is foreign owned if foreign investors holdat
least 50% of capital. ’Always domestic’ refers to firms that did not change ownership during the sample
period, ’Acquired by foreign investors’ refers to firms that changed foreign ownership status only once during
the sample period. Firms acquired in 2002 are excluded from the estimation sample, due to missing data for
the variables included in the selection equation (values of sales, wage bill and labor productivity in 2001).
Table A3: Importance of the estimation sample in the private sector as a whole 




Panel A: t-test before and after matching
Variable




Log sales Unmatched 15.1110 13.9820 71.8 20.680 0.000
Matched 15.0620 15.0780 -1.3 98 -0.200 0.845
Sales growth Unmatched 4.1640 2.1567 2.8 0.600 0.549
Matched 4.2159 4.9165 -1.0 65 -0.200 0.842
Lagged sales growth Unmatched 13.5760 2.2223 11.7 2.840 0.005
Matched 13.7780 3.8880 10.2 13 1.450 0.148
Log labor productivity Unmatched 11.3220 10.7980 41.2 11.930 0.000
Matched 11.3070 11.2630 3.5 92 0.590 0.558
Labor productivity growth Unmatched 3.6741 2.2034 1.8 0.350 0.728
Matched 3.7200 3.9449 -0.3 85 -0.080 0.938
Lagged labor productivity growth Unmatched 14.4660 2.1987 11.9 3.170 0.002
Matched 14.6820 3.4830 10.8 9 1.560 0.118
Log hourly wage Unmatched 1.8798 1.4127 96.6 28.420 0.000
Matched 1.8688 1.8452 4.6 95 0.760 0.447
Log hourly wage squared Unmatched 3.8326 2.1639 89.0 30.640 0.000
Matched 3.7772 3.6529 6.6 93 1.050 0.292
Hourly wage growth Unmatched 0.1452 0.0655 6.5 4.430 0.000
Matched 0.0811 0.0516 2.4 63 0.880 0.381
Lagged hourly wage growth Unmatched 0.1062 0.0619 9.8 2.040 0.042
Matched 0.0839 0.1867 -22.7 -132 -2.300 0.022
Employment Unmatched 118.89 40.24 23.4 16.090 0.000
Matched 92.39 112.60 -6.0 74 -1.010 0.311
Number of layers Unmatched 2.4407 2.0089 53.9 14.160 0.000
Matched 2.4318 2.4318 0.0 100 0.000 1.000
Food, beverage, tobacco Unmatched 0.0337 0.0475 -7.0 -1.620 0.105
Matched 0.0308 0.0308 0.0 100 0.000 1.000
Textiles, leather Unmatched 0.0801 0.1250 -14.8 -3.380 0.001
Matched 0.0796 0.0796 0.0 100 0.000 1.000
Wood, cork, paper Unmatched 0.0337 0.0487 -7.6 -1.750 0.080
Matched 0.0341 0.0341 0.0 100 0.000 1.000
Non-metallic manufacturing Unmatched 0.1010 0.0490 19.8 6.010 0.000
Matched 0.1023 0.1023 0.0 100 0.000 1.000
Metallic manufacturing Unmatched 0.1234 0.0834 13.100 3.610 0.000
Matched 0.1250 0.1250 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Furniture Unmatched 0.0112 0.0280 -12.100 -2.540 0.011
Matched 0.0114 0.0114 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Construction Unmatched 0.0513 0.1285 -27.200 -5.760 0.000
Matched 0.0520 0.0520 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Wholesale and retail trade Unmatched 0.3093 0.2403 15.500 4.030 0.000
Matched 0.3117 0.3117 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Hotels and restaurants Unmatched 0.0305 0.0733 -19.400 -4.100 0.000
Matched 0.0308 0.0308 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Transport, storage, other Unmatched 0.0609 0.0354 11.900 3.430 0.001
Matched 0.0617 0.0617 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Table A4:  Indicators of covariate balancing before and after matching
Mean
Panel A: t-test before and after matching (cont.)
Sample




Post, telecommunications Unmatched 0.0048 0.0007 8.000 4.030 0.000
Matched 0.0016 0.0016 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Financial intermediation Unmatched 0.0160 0.0066 8.900 2.890 0.004
Matched 0.0146 0.0146 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Real estate, renting, business Unmatched 0.1154 0.0763 13.300 3.680 0.000
Matched 0.1153 0.1153 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Education Unmatched 0.0032 0.0153 -12.600 -2.460 0.014
Matched 0.0033 0.0033 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Health, social work Unmatched 0.0064 0.0213 -12.700 -2.570 0.010
Matched 0.0065 0.0065 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Other social activities Unmatched 0.0096 0.0128 -3.000 -0.700 0.486
Matched 0.0097 0.0097 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1991 Unmatched 0.1010 0.0498 19.500 5.860 0.000
Matched 0.1023 0.1023 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1992 Unmatched 0.0737 0.0506 9.600 2.630 0.009
Matched 0.0747 0.0747 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1993 Unmatched 0.0417 0.0478 -2.900 -0.710 0.477
Matched 0.0422 0.0422 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1994 Unmatched 0.0449 0.0509 -2.800 -0.680 0.494
Matched 0.0455 0.0455 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1996 Unmatched 0.0224 0.0502 -14.900 -3.170 0.002
Matched 0.0211 0.0211 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1997 Unmatched 0.0465 0.0516 -2.400 -0.580 0.562
Matched 0.0471 0.0471 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1998 Unmatched 0.0192 0.0533 -18.300 -3.790 0.000
Matched 0.0195 0.0195 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
1999 Unmatched 0.0369 0.0559 -9.100 -2.070 0.038
Matched 0.0373 0.0373 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2000 Unmatched 0.0385 0.0619 -10.800 -2.430 0.015
Matched 0.0390 0.0390 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2002 Unmatched 0.1827 0.0694 34.600 11.120 0.000
Matched 0.1818 0.1818 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2003 Unmatched 0.0833 0.0713 4.500 1.170 0.242
Matched 0.0844 0.0844 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2004 Unmatched 0.0353 0.0748 -17.400 -3.750 0.000
Matched 0.0357 0.0357 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2005 Unmatched 0.0529 0.0766 -9.700 -2.230 0.026
Matched 0.0503 0.0503 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2007 Unmatched 0.0946 0.0782 5.800 1.520 0.128
Matched 0.0909 0.0909 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
2008 Unmatched 0.0609 0.0798 -7.400 -1.740 0.082
Matched 0.0617 0.0617 0.000 100 0.000 1.000
Table A4:  Indicators of the covariate balancing before and after matching (cont.)
Mean
Panel B: Two-group Hotelling T-squared test
Sample T-squared F-test p-value
Matched 5.534 0.138 1.000
Panel C: Pseudo R2 and test of joint sifnificance of regressors
Sample Pseudo R2 Chi2 p-value
Unmatched 0.128 1416.95 0.000
Matched 0.003 4.91 1.000
Notes: The table reports results from the tests of matching quality described in section 4. The individual t-
tests and the two-group Hotelling t-square statistic assess for mean equality of observable attributes
between domestic and acquired firms in thematched sample. The Pseudo R2 of the logit on thematched
data and test of joint signicance of regressors given by theChi-square test provide evidence on the overall
quality of the matching procedure.
Table A4:  Indicators of the covariate balancing before and after matching (concl.)
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2)
Firms with initially 1 layer
Foreign ownership 0.0790 0.1014*
  (0.0546)     (0.0548)
Industry trends N Y
N (obs.) 1,446 1,446
N (firms) 181 181
Firms with initially 2 layers
Foreign ownership 0.1620*** 0.1628***
  (0.0593)       (0.0597)     
Industry trends N Y
N (obs.) 3,763 3,763
N (firms) 432 432
Firms with initially 3 layers
Foreign ownership 0.1345*** 0.1326***
  (0.0449)       (0.0443)     
Industry trends N Y
N (obs.) 4,938 4,938
N (firms) 510 510
Firms with initially 4 layers
Foreign ownership 0.0943 0.0904
  (0.1109)     (0.1031)
Industry trends N Y
N (obs.) 976 976
N (firms) 94 94
Table A5: Effects of foreign acquisition on employment
log employment
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5% level,
and ***1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Dependent variable: sales
Foreign ownership    0.3752***    0.3771***    0.2880***    0.2887***
(0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0547) (0.0548)
Industry trends N Y N Y
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 11,082 11,082
N (firms) 74,666 74,666 1214 1214
B. Dependent variable: labor productivity
Foreign ownership 0.2406*** 0.2440*** 0.1539*** 0.1549***
(0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0467) (0.0469)
Industry trends N Y N Y
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 11,082 11,082
N (firms) 74,666 74,666 1214 1214
C. Dependent variable: hourly wage
Foreign ownership 0.0800*** 0.0808*** 0.0675*** 0.0659***
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0134) (0.0134)
Industry trends N Y N Y
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 11,082 11,082
N (firms) 74,666 74,666 1214 1214
D. Dependent variable: number of layers
Foreign ownership 0.0981*** 0.1000*** 0.1339*** 0.1301***
(0.0275) (0.0274) (0.0311) (0.0307)
Industry trends N Y N Y
N (obs.) 432,955 432,955 11,082 11,082
N (firms) 74,666 74,666 1214 1214
Table A6: Effects of foreign acquisition on sales, labor productivity, hourly wage and 
number of layers (pooled)
Full sample Matched sample
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year dummies.













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Use of intranet (yes=1) 0.6987 0.6734 0.8750 0.8190 0.7634 0.8632
(0.4588) (0.4690) (0.3310) (0.3859) (0.4276) (0.3451)
Use of e-mail (yes=1) 0.9941 0.9933 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
(0.0763) (0.0816) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Use of extranet (yes=1) 0.4412 0.4244 0.5578 0.4905 0.4194 0.5470
(0.4966) (0.4943) (0.4971) (0.5012) (0.4965) (0.4999)
Use of internal networks (yes=1) 0.8946 0.8826 0.9776 0.9857 0.9677 1.0000
(0.3071) (0.3219) (0.1481) (0.1190) (0.1778) (0.0000)
Log sales 17.0425 16.9941 17.3791 17.3743 17.3629 17.3833
(1.4272) (1.4273) (1.3820) (1.4796) (1.5130) (1.4594)
Employment 377.8674 357.0394 522.8862 310.9952 288.5376 328.8462
(817.4347) (734.948) (1240.308) (333.4359) (247.4193) (388.6565)
Log labor productivity 11.8568 11.8376 11.9906 12.1480  12.1458 12.1497
(1.4956) (1.4940) (1.5010) (1.4151) (1.3755) (1.4521)
Log hourly wage 1.9207 1.8831 2.1830 2.0102 1.9903 2.0261
(0.4590) (0.4356) (0.5273) (0.3579) (0.3163) (0.3885)
N (obs.) 4,268 3,732 536 200 83 117
N (firms) 1,624 1,452 172 61 29 32
Notes: The table reports means and standarddeviations (in parentheses) for firm-year observations with more
than 10 employees over the period 2004-2009 of firms that are not foreign owned in their first year in the
sample. A firm is foreign owned if foreign investors holdat least 50% of capital. Columns (1) and (4) refer to
all firms, column (2) and (5), refer to firms that didnot change ownershipduring the sample period,columns
(3) and (6) refer to firms that changed to foreign ownership status only once during the sample period.
Monetary variables are in 2009 prices.
Full sample Matched sample
Table A7: Summary statistics, auxiliary survey data
Dependent variable: use of intranet (1) (2)
Foreign ownership 0.1398* 0.1865**
(0.0814) (0.0876)
Industry trends N Y
R2 0.725 0.751
N (obs.) 186 186
N (firms) 49 49
Table A8: Effects of foreign acquisition on the use of intranet (matching 
also on intranet use prior to foreign acquisition)
Notes: Foreign ownership status is lagged one year. All regressions include year
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at firm level. *10% level, **5%
level, and *1% level.
